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 In Mukaddam v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd 2013 2 SA 254 (SCA), Nugent JA 
stated that, once the class is confined to claimants who choose positively 
to advance their claims and are required to come forward for that purpose, 
he can see no reason why they are not capable of doing so in their own 
names through joinder – they do not need a representative to do so on their 
behalf. The members who choose to opt in to the class action will thus be 
identifiable. If that is the case then, according Nugent JA, joinder may be 
the appropriate procedural device. A problem evidenced by this approach 
is accordingly that, by suggesting that joinder is the appropriate procedural 
device where all the claimants are identifiable, rather than a class action, 
the court essentially attacked the viability of the opt-in regime of class 
action litigation. 
The preferential treatment afforded by our courts to the opt-out class action 
regime is further reinforced by the finding of Nugent JA that the opt-in class 
action regime can be utilised only in exceptional circumstances. As 
exceptional circumstances had not been proved, he found that a class 
action was not the most appropriate way to pursue the claims. He 
accordingly suggested that joinder was a viable option to pursue the claims. 
The opt-in class action regime requires individual class members to take 
positive steps to participate in the class action. In other words, class 
members are required to come forward and opt into the class action, failing 
which they will not be bound by or benefit from the outcome of the litigation. 
Support for the opt-in regime is essentially premised on the belief that 
individuals who are unaware of the litigation should not be bound by its 
outcome. The opt-out class action regime, on the other hand, automatically 
binds members of the class to the class action and the outcome of the 
litigation unless the individual class members take steps to opt out of the 
class action. Support for the opt-out regime is essentially based on the view 
that the opting-in requirement could undermine one of the primary purposes 
of class action litigation, which is to facilitate access to justice. 
The Constitutional Court in Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2013 5 
SA 89 (CC) held that Nugent JA was wrong to find that an applicant in an 
opt-in class action is required to show exceptional circumstances. 
However, the court did not provide reasons for its disagreement. The issue 
relating to exceptional circumstances in opt-in class actions was dealt with 
in two sentences. The Constitutional Court also failed to deal with the 
nature and status of the opt-in class action compared with opt-out class 
actions in South African law. 
The note will accordingly consider when, if at all, it is appropriate to use the 
opt-in class action regime compared to the opt-out class action regime. 
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1 Introduction 
Nugent JA in Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd1 held that, once the 
class is confined to claimants who choose positively to advance their claims 
and are required to come forward for that purpose (that is, choosing to "opt-
in"), he can see no reason why they are not capable of doing so in their own 
names through joinder – they do not need a representative to do so on their 
behalf.2 By suggesting that joinder is the appropriate procedural device 
where all the claimants are identifiable, Nugent JA clearly questioned the 
viability of the opt-in regime of class action litigation. He also held that the 
opt-in class action regime could be utilised only in exceptional 
circumstances.3 As exceptional circumstances were not proved, he found 
that a class action was not the appropriate way to pursue the claims.4 
The Constitutional Court (CC) in Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd5 held 
that the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Mukaddam SCA was wrong to 
find that an applicant in an opt-in class action is required to show exceptional 
circumstances. Although the CC did not provide reasons for its 
disagreement with the finding of the SCA in this regard, the fact of the matter 
is that, as our law currently stands, there is no need to prove exceptional 
circumstances to be able to utilise the opt-in procedure. 
It is therefore currently unclear regarding when, if ever, it is appropriate to 
use the opt-in class action regime rather than the opt-out class action 
regime. In the absence of legislation regulating class actions, our courts 
have not provided sufficient guidance on this issue. 
The South African Law Commission6 (SALC) recommended that courts 
should have a discretion to make opt-in, opt-out or no notice orders.7 
However, the approach of the court in Mukaddam SCA regarding the opt-in 
class action regime, as mentioned above, contradicts this recommendation. 
It also complicates the issue of notice in class action proceedings. This note 
                                            
*  Theo Broodryk. BA LLB LLD (US). Head: Stellenbosch University Law Clinic and 
Senior Lecturer, Stellenbosch University, South Africa. E-mail: 
tbroodryk@sun.ac.za. 
1  Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2013 2 SA 254 (SCA) (hereafter Mukaddam 
SCA) 
2  Mukaddam SCA para 12. 
3  If the effect of Nugent JA's comment that joinder is appropriate where all the class 
members are identifiable is to negate the need for a South African opt-in class action 
regime, then Nugent JA seemingly contradicts himself by requiring that exceptional 
circumstances must be proved before the opt-in procedure can be used. 
4  Mukaddam SCA paras 11, 14. 
5  Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2013 5 SA 89 (CC) (hereafter Mukaddam CC). 
6  At the time it was known as the South African Law Commission. It became the South 
African Law Reform Commission in 2002. 
7  SALC Project 88 – Report para 5.10.24. 
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will accordingly consider the nature and status of the opt-in class action 
compared with the opt-out class action and, in view of Nugent JA's 
comments, when, if at all, the opt-in procedure should be utilised rather than 
the opt-out procedure.8 
In an opt-out class action, individuals who fall within the class definition are 
automatically included in the class unless an individual affirmatively 
requests exclusion from the class. In other words, class members are 
provided with an opportunity to opt out if they do not wish to be part of the 
class action.9 Consequently, class members who do not opt out are bound 
by the outcome of the class action.10 Class members who choose to opt out 
are at liberty to pursue individual claims against the defendant. 
In an opt-in class action, individual class members who fall within the class 
definition must affirmatively request inclusion to form part of the class action. 
Class members who do not opt into the class action are not bound by its 
outcome and they will accordingly be at liberty to pursue individual claims 
against the defendant. Naturally, they will also forfeit the opportunity to 
share in the benefits obtained by the class in the event of a favourable 
judgment. 
Support for the opt-out regime is based essentially on the view that the opt-
in requirement could undermine one of the primary purposes of class action 
litigation, which is to facilitate access to justice.11 It has also been argued 
that the opt-in regime presupposes that failing to opt in is the result of a 
properly contemplated decision by the individual class member not to 
participate in the class action. However, this is not necessarily always the 
case, especially in South Africa, where the existence of financial and social 
barriers could result in a failure to opt in. Such a requirement could 
accordingly defeat the primary purpose of class actions, namely access to 
justice, especially where small individual claims are involved.12 
Conversely, support for the opt-in regime is essentially premised on the 
belief that individuals who are unaware of the litigation should not be bound 
by its outcome. In other words, in the absence of proper notice of the class 
proceedings, an individual should not be bound by the judgment of the court 
in the matter. Proponents of the opt-in regime further argue inter alia that it 
makes it easier for class members to assess13 whether they are being 
adequately represented in the proceedings, since they are required to act 
                                            
8  The CC in Mukaddam CC did not properly engage with these issues. 
9  See, for example, s 9 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 6. 
10  See, for example, s 27(3) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 6. 
11  SALC Project 88 – Report para 5.11.3. 
12  SALC Project 88 – Report para 5.11. 
13  Compared with the opt-out regime. 
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positively to join in and benefit from the class action. It may also have the 
effect of reducing the costs associated with the litigation and result in 
increased efficiency, which is beneficial for all interested parties.14   
Against the above background, this article will consider and attempt to 
establish whether there is room for the opt-in class action regime in South 
African law and when, if at all, the opt-in procedure should be utilised rather 
than the opt-out procedure.  Ultimately, the purpose of the article is to assist 
in developing a structure that could facilitate the adjudication of class 
actions in South Africa insofar as this issue is concerned.  
Before considering the nature and status of the opt-in class action compared 
with the opt-out class action in further detail and when, if at all, the opt-in 
procedure should be utilised rather than the opt-out procedure, the 
approaches of foreign jurisdictions will be considered. 
2  The approaches of foreign jurisdictions 
The opt-out class action regime is undoubtedly universally more popular 
than the opt-in class action regime. Conversely, the opt-in class action 
regime is utilised in only a limited number of foreign jurisdictions, such as 
the group litigation regime in Sweden and the Group Litigation Order under 
the Civil Procedure Rules in England and Wales. Further examples of 
jurisdictions employing an opt-in class action regime are Germany, 
specifically in the context of certain securities cases, and Denmark.15  
Ontario subscribes to the opt-out class action regime.16 In the Ontario Law 
Reform Commission Report on Class Actions,17 the perceived 
disadvantages of the opt-in class action regime were considered, 
specifically the reason why an opt-in class action scenario generally results 
in a smaller class than when class members are permitted to opt out.18 The 
Ontario Commission confirmed that there is disagreement regarding the 
conclusions that should be drawn from a failure by individuals to opt into a 
class action. On the one hand, it has been argued that a failure to opt in 
reflects disinterest in the class action claim. Conversely, it has been argued 
that the failure to opt in arises from a variety of factors other than a lack of 
interest on the part of putative class members, which may result in the size 
of the class being reduced in an arbitrary and inappropriate manner. Such 
                                            
14  SALC Project 88 – Report para 5.11. 
15  Also see Morabito 2003 Tex Int'l LJ 671. 
16  Section 9 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 6. Also see Walker 2010 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1491167 5. 
17  Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions. 
18  Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions 467-492. 
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factors, according to the Ontario Commission, include fear of involvement 
in the legal process, concern over the amount of legal costs, fear of sanction 
from employers or others who may be in a position to retaliate, or the 
demands of everyday life.19 These factors may prevent a class member 
from taking the steps necessary to opt in.20  
The Ontario Commission further found that the need to give notice to class 
members that they must opt into the class action creates difficulties that may 
result in the exclusion of class members who are not necessarily indifferent 
to the harm done to them. In many class actions, the identity of class 
members is initially unknown and, accordingly, notification that they must 
opt in if they wish to participate in the class action presents a serious 
problem. To the extent that class members do not receive this information, 
an opt-in requirement may exclude individuals who never had a real 
opportunity to express interest in the suit. Even where class members can 
be located, they may not appreciate the significance of a notice and may fail 
to read it. They may also experience problems understanding its content. 
Further, according to the Ontario Commission, even if class members 
understand the notice, they may be unsure whether the class action applies 
to them.21  
The Ontario Commission concluded that low response rates by class 
members who are required to opt in might be attributable to problems of the 
sort described above and not necessarily to any general lack of interest in 
class actions. It stated that it is important to provide increased access to the 
courts for persons who wish to pursue existing remedies but are unable to 
do so. It also found that, irrespective of the claims' merits, economic, social 
and psychological barriers may prevent them from being individually 
litigated. Class actions can help overcome such barriers and, by providing 
increased access to the courts, may perform an important function in 
society.22 The Ontario Commission accordingly endorsed the opt-out class 
action regime inter alia for the reasons set out above.23 
In Australia the issue as to whether it should adopt an opt-in or opt-out class 
action model was subject to extensive debate prior to the enforcement of 
                                            
19  Regardless of whether or not such concerns are ill-founded. 
20  Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions 132. 
21  Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions 132-133. This problem 
does, however, seem to be more prominent in the context of the opt-out regime of 
class action litigation where, according to Klonoff Class Actions 131, courts are 
reluctant to certify classes whose members would be difficult to communicate with 
or identify.  
22  Klonoff Class Actions 121. 
23  The Ontario Commission's support for the opt-out regime supports the author's 
contention that access to justice is of crucial importance when determining whether 
or not class proceedings are appropriate. 
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Part IVA of the Federal Court Act, 1976 (Cth). The opt-out model is now 
embodied in Part IVA of the Federal Court Act, Part 4A of the Supreme 
Court Act, 1986 (Vic) and Part 10 of the Civil Procedure Act, 2005 (NSW). 
The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) previously recommended 
that, "[s]ubject to the provision of appropriate protection, it should be 
possible to commence a group member's proceeding without first obtaining 
consent of that group member", That is, opt-out class action proceedings 
should be possible and are indeed preferable.24 When the Federal Court of 
Australia Amendment Bill, 1991 (Cth) was debated in the House of 
Representatives, the Attorney General made the following comment, which 
effectively echoes the view of the Ontario Commission referred to above, in 
that significant weight was attached to the exclusionary effect of the opt-in 
class action regime in respect of potential class members and the 
consequential deprivation of their right to access to justice: 
The Government believes that an opt-out procedure is preferable on both 
grounds of equity and efficiency. It ensures that people, particularly those who 
are poor or less educated, can obtain redress where they may be unable to 
take the positive step of having themselves included in the proceedings. It also 
achieves the goals of obtaining a common, binding decision while leaving a 
person who wishes to do so free to leave the group to pursue his or her claim 
separately.25 
The approach followed by the foreign jurisdictions discussed above is 
therefore to reject the opt-in class action regime insofar as it arbitrarily 
reduces the size of potential classes at the expense of putative class 
members' right of access to justice. For example, the Ontario Commission 
held that:  
In our view, the incorporation of an opt in requirement…would be 
fundamentally inconsistent with the access to justice rationale that we have 
endorsed as a basic justification for an expanded class action procedure in 
Ontario...Since we believe that the meaning of silence is equivocal, and does 
not necessarily indicate indifference or lack of interest, class members should 
not be denied whatever benefits are secured by the class action by failing to 
act at this stage of the proceedings …26 
Similarly, it has been stated that "the opt out model is the more effective 
means to ensure that the barriers to justice, which class actions are 
intended to overcome, are reduced".27 Hensler states that:  
In consumer class actions involving small individual losses, requiring class 
members to opt in would lead to smaller classes that would likely obtain 
smaller aggregate settlements … The social science research on active 
versus passive assent suggests that minority and low-income individuals 
                                            
24  ALRC Grouped Proceedings 98-130. 
25  Australia House of Representatives Debates 3175. 
26  Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions 484-485. 
27  Ministry of the Attorney General, British Columbia Consultation Document 8. 
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might be disproportionately affected by an opt-in requirement, a worrisome 
possibility.28 
In its report on class actions, the Alberta Law Reform Institute lists various 
perceived advantages and disadvantages of both the opt-in and the opt-out 
class action regimes. It provides that the general advantages of opting out 
include enhancing access to justice, in that class members are 
automatically included as part of the class; that class members retain the 
choice to opt out of the proceedings for whatever reason; and that class 
members who opt out can pursue individualised litigation.29 The 
disadvantages of opting out include that class members may not receive 
notice of the class proceedings; that class members who do not opt out are 
bound by the outcome of the proceedings whether or not they want to be; 
that the class proceedings may attract claimants who do not want to be part 
of the proceedings or would not otherwise have litigated; and that opting out 
operates in violation of the freedom of the individual to choose whether or 
not to institute proceedings.30 
Arguments for opting in include that a class member will be bound by the 
result only if he or she intends to be bound thereto; that all class members 
who stand to benefit will have shown some interest in the litigation; that the 
outcome will not be binding upon individuals who do not have knowledge of 
the lawsuit; that opting in is consistent with the general position in respect 
of ordinary procedures for commencing legal proceedings; and that persons 
who do not opt in can litigate their claims outside the ambit of the class 
action.31 Arguments against opting in include that the potential class 
members who choose not to opt in may not know of the class proceedings; 
that opting in may deny access to justice to potential class members who 
fail to opt in because of economic, psychological and social barriers; and 
that a class action is essentially a permissive joinder device if it is available 
only to those people who choose to sue together.32 
It is apparent from the above that the choice between the opt-in and opt-out 
class action regimes is a difficult one and one that has been subject to 
debate. Our courts have also not provided sufficient guidance on this issue. 
The following part of this note accordingly considers, with regard to the 
                                            
28  Hensler Class Action Dilemmas 476. 
29  ALRI Class Actions 95. 
30  ALRI Class Actions 96. 
31  ALRI Class Actions 96. 
32  ALRI Class Actions 97. The American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure distinguish 
between compulsory or necessary joinder and permissive joinder. Necessary joinder 
entails that parties or claims must be added to the litigation in order for it to proceed. 
Permissive joinder occurs when the parties or claims are permitted to be added to 
the litigation. If the parties or claims are not added, the court will still allow the lawsuit 
to proceed. 
T BROODRYK  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  8 
approaches of the foreign jurisdictions referred to above, whether there is 
room for the opt-in class action regime in South African law and when, if at 
all, the opt-in procedure should be utilised rather than the opt-out procedure. 
3  Possible approaches in South African law  
The SALC recommended that the court should provide directions in respect 
of the procedure to be followed as part of the certification process of a class 
action and that the court should have a wide discretion to determine its own 
procedures. It further recommended that the court should possess broad 
general management powers, exercisable either on the application of a 
party or on the court's own motion. The SALC proposed that legislation 
should be adopted regulating class actions in South Africa and that the 
legislation should deal with the questions of when, by whom, to whom, and 
how notice should be given. As a general rule, according to the SALC, notice 
to class members and prospective class members should always be given 
and the court should retain a discretion to make opt-in, opt-out or no notice 
orders. The court should in all cases consider whether notice of the 
certification application should be given to all persons eligible to elect to join 
the class.33 
It is apparent from the above that the SALC clearly envisaged that 
circumstances may arise where it would be preferable to require members 
to opt into class proceedings. To establish the basis for the SALC's 
recommendation that the court should retain a discretion to make opt-in, 
opt-out or no notice orders, it is necessary to consider the SALC's Working 
Paper. In the Working Paper, the SALC stated that provision should be 
made for opt-in notice in limited situations because there may be 
circumstances where class members with substantial claims would be 
severely prejudiced if the class action fails because it was not effectively 
prosecuted. A judgment in such circumstances would render the individual 
claims res judicata, therefore preventing further litigation on the same issue. 
It is therefore important to ensure that class members know of the class 
action if they are to be bound by the outcome.34 Therefore, according to the 
SALC, circumstances may indeed arise that justify the use of the opt-in 
procedure rather than the opt-out procedure. 
As mentioned above, in an opt-in class action, individual class members 
who fall within the class definition must, upon receiving the opt-in notice, opt 
into the class action to form part thereof. Class members who do not opt 
into the class action, whether it is because they did not receive notice or did 
                                            
33  SALC Working Paper No 57 vii. 
34  SALC Working Paper No 57 para 5.32. 
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receive notice but consciously chose not to opt into the class action, are not 
bound by its outcome and they will accordingly be at liberty to pursue 
individual claims against the defendant. Naturally, they will also forfeit the 
opportunity to share in the benefits obtained by the class in the event of a 
favourable judgment. 
According to the SALC, the advantage of an opt-in notice is that there is 
certainty as to who the members of the class are and what the aggregate 
value of the claims is. The defendant is thus in a better position to make a 
well-reasoned judgement as to his or her liability in order to decide whether 
to make a settlement offer.35 The fact that the opt-in procedure is nothing 
more than a permissive joinder device is not a problem. Litigation through 
joinder is made possible by our court rules; however, there is a point at 
which joinder becomes cumbersome. The SALC states that "it becomes 
cumbersome when there are more than four or five plaintiffs and extremely 
cumbersome when there are more than about ten."36 Claimants who opt in 
will be in much the same position as plaintiffs who join in an action, except 
that the representative will conduct the action on their behalf. The actual 
management of the action is likely to be simpler and less cumbersome than 
where a large number of plaintiffs are joined.37 The SALC accordingly found 
that there are circumstances where joinder, although possible, would not be 
appropriate and that in such cases, the opt-in procedure may be the 
appropriate means of adjudicating class members' claims. 
The SALC recommended that the courts may require that an opt-in notice 
be given, but stated that it would be the exception rather than the rule. 
According to the SALC it is obvious why the opt-out procedure is preferable. 
Similar to the findings of the Ontario Commission, the SALC attached 
significant weight to financial and social barriers, the existence of which may 
preclude participation in class proceedings by potential class members. The 
SALC considered the fact that a large portion of our society is poor, illiterate 
and uninformed because they have not been properly educated. It is 
therefore important to ensure that this portion of society benefits from class 
actions, probably more so than in certain other foreign jurisdictions. 
Accordingly, the SALC recommended that courts should only that an opt-in 
notice be given only where there is a possibility that class members may be 
severely prejudiced. Prejudice in this context entails being bound by a 
judgment without having knowledge of the class action. The SALC uses the 
following example: a large number of people suffer damages as a result of 
an incident such as an airplane crash, and where the individual claims are 
sufficiently large to make it probable that the claimants would enforce their 
                                            
35  SALC Working Paper No 57 para 5.24. 
36  SALC Working Paper No 57 para 5.24. 
37  SALC Working Paper No 57 para 5.24. 
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own claims. In such a scenario, according to the SALC, the claimants should 
not be bound by a judgment unless they have expressly consented to be 
bound.38  
From the above example, it can be inferred that the SALC appears to have 
envisaged that the opt-in procedure should be used in circumstances where 
the size of the class would be much more limited than where an opt-out 
procedure would typically be used. In such circumstances, the individual 
class members would be identifiable as, for example, with the survivors of 
an airplane accident and, importantly, each class member would have a 
substantial individual claim. De Vos states that the opt-in regime of class 
action litigation caters especially for those circumstances where the 
members of the class have substantial individual claims. He argues that, 
since the judgment in a class action has a res judicata effect on all the class 
members except those who have been excluded, it is important that class 
members with such claims should be apprised of the action and given the 
option to associate themselves with it. Otherwise they could be severely 
prejudiced if a class action fails due to mismanagement.39 
In Mukaddam SCA, Nugent JA held that the fact "[t]hat the plaintiffs might 
be numerous – in this case it is said that there might be 100, although there 
is no reason to think that all will join – is in itself no reason to preclude a joint 
action. Perhaps there will be more paper – though even that is not 
necessarily true – but that is no more than administrative inconvenience 
…".40 The court footnoted this comment with the following statement: 
In the United States a class action is not competent if all the claimants can be 
joined. Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a party 
seeking certification to demonstrate, amongst other things, that 'the class is 
so numerous that joinder is impracticable'.41 
The above-mentioned comments of Nugent JA are problematic in various 
respects. It is not the case in the United States that, where joinder of all the 
claimants is possible, class proceedings are not appropriate. American 
class proceedings may be appropriate where joinder is possible but not 
necessarily feasible.42 If joinder is possible, but would needlessly 
complicate the litigation of the case, then class action proceedings may be 
appropriate.43 The impracticability of joinder does not entail impossibility.44 
Accordingly, the identifiability of individual class members will form part of 
                                            
38  SALC Working Paper No 57 para 5.25. 
39  De Vos 1996 TSAR 647-648. 
40  Mukaddam SCA para 13. 
41  Mukaddam SCA para 13. 
42  Anderson and Trask Class Action Playbook 26-27. 
43  Anderson and Trask Class Action Playbook 26-27. 
44  See Robidoux v Celani 987 F 2d 931 935-936. 
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the assessment of the impracticability of joinder – however, it is not the only 
consideration in determining the practicability of joinder as compared with 
class proceedings.45 
It further appears that Nugent JA did not give proper consideration to the 
judgment of Cameron JA in Ngxuza, where he held that joinder 
presupposes that prospective plaintiffs will approach courts en masse, but 
that this often fails to materialise insofar as the "various parties who have 
the common interest are isolated, scattered and utter strangers to each 
other".46 In such circumstances, the conditions for group action through 
joinder do not exist. According to Cameron JA, society cannot simply set up 
courts and wait for litigants to bring their complaints, as barriers may exist 
that preclude their participation in litigious proceedings; hence the need for 
class proceedings.47 Simply stating that a numerous class consisting of 
approximately 100 claimants is insufficient to preclude litigation through 
joinder – or stated differently, that joinder is possible where the class 
consists of 100 claimants – does not take account of the practicalities 
associated with joinder or the benefits of a class action. Such an approach 
disregards the considerations that are relevant in determining the 
appropriateness of class proceedings as a means of adjudicating the claims 
of class members.   
Linkside v Minister of Basic Education48 serves as a fitting example and 
evidences what the SALC and De Vos had in mind when stating that 
circumstances may arise where the use of the opt-in procedure is both 
necessary and justifiable. Linkside is the first South African opt-in class 
action. A class action was instituted in the Eastern Cape High Court, 
Grahamstown, against the Minister of Basic Education, the Director–
General of the National Department of Basic Education, the MEC, 
Department of Basic Education in the Eastern Cape Province, and the Head 
of the Department of Basic Education in the Eastern Cape Province, 
seeking an order directing the respondents to appoint educators 
permanently to allocated vacant substantive posts and to reimburse schools 
that were being forced to pay educators whom the State was required to 
pay. The class action was instituted on behalf of all public schools registered 
as such in the Eastern Cape whose vacant substantive posts were not filled 
on a permanent basis and who were forced to pay educators whom the 
State was required to pay. The schools were afforded the opportunity to opt 
                                            
45  Klonoff Class Actions 40. 
46  Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 4 SA 
1184 (SCA) (hereafter Ngxuza) paras 4-5. 
47  Ngxuza paras 4-5. 
48  Linkside v Minister of Basic Education (HC) (unreported) case number 3844/2014 of 
17 December 2014 (hereafter Linkside). 
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into the class action by sending a written notice to the legal representatives 
of the class.49 The opt-in class action was consented to by the Department 
of Basic Education. The case was subsequently settled, in terms of which 
settlement the Department of Basic Education, Eastern Cape was ordered 
to pay R81-million to the schools that opted into the class action. 
In Linkside, the number of class members who opted in was limited to 90, 
all of whom were identifiable, and the claims of the individual class members 
were large enough to make it likely that they would litigate independently in 
the absence of a class action. In this regard, the differences between 
Linkside and other South African class action cases, including Ngxuza, 
Children's Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd50 and 
Mukaddam SCA, are obvious.51 For example, in Ngxuza Cameron JA stated 
that: 
The situation seemed pattern-made for class proceedings …Their individual 
claims are small: the value of the social assistance they receive … would 
secure them hardly a single hour's consultation at current rates with most 
urban lawyers. They are scattered throughout the Eastern Cape Province, 
many of them in small towns and remote rural areas … .52 
He further referred to "[t]he circumstances of this particular case – unlawful 
conduct by a party against a disparate body of claimants lacking access to 
individualised legal services, with small claims unsuitable for if not incapable 
of enforcement in isolation …".53 
In Children's Resource Centre Trust, Wallis JA held that "[t]he class of 
people on whose behalf the appellants seek to pursue claims … is both 
large and in general poor. Any claims they may have against the 
respondents are not large enough to warrant their being pursued 
separately…".54 
Because the judgment has a res judicata effect on all class members other 
than those who have been excluded, the class members in Linkside should 
not be bound by a judgment unless they have been apprised of the action 
                                            
49  The written notice in terms of which class members opted into the class action had 
to set out a list of substantive vacancies on the 2014 post establishment at the school 
concerned and the payments made by the school to educators in permanent posts 
(together with proof of such payments) and which had not been reimbursed by the 
Department of Basic Education. 
50  Children's Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) 
(hereafter Children's Resource Centre Trust). 
51  Rather unsurprisingly, the majority of South African class actions pertain to the 
purported vindication of certain socio-economic rights, as was the case in the 
Ngxuza, Children's Resource Centre Trust and Mukaddam judgments. 
52  Ngxuza  para 11. Emphasis added. 
53  Ngxuza para 14. Emphasis added. 
54  Children's Resource Centre Trust para 16. Emphasis added. 
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and given the option to associate themselves with it. The more targeted opt-
in mechanism was accordingly preferable, otherwise the putative class 
members could be severely prejudiced if the class action failed due to 
mismanagement.  
As we have seen, according to the Ontario Commission, it is questionable 
whether it is necessary to protect the interests of individuals with large 
claims from any prejudice that might ensue if the class action were not 
prosecuted skilfully. The Ontario Commission stated that, where a class 
member wanted to institute proceedings independently, he or she would be 
free to do so by opting out of the class action.55 However, the possibility 
exists that the opt-out notice may not come to the attention of the class 
member, that the class member may consequently fail to opt out of the class 
action, and that an unsuccessful outcome of such action due to 
mismanagement would be binding on the class member. The opt-in regime, 
with its individualised notice, is accordingly preferable in the 
circumstances.56  
The purpose of affording the court a discretion to choose between the type 
of class action procedure to be followed is inter alia to determine, with 
reference to the facts of the specific case, whether ordering that the opt-in 
procedure be utilised would have the effect of potentially denying people a 
legal remedy simply because they may fail to comprehend the opt-in 
requirement, may be fearful of taking action, or may otherwise be precluded 
from opting into the class action. Therefore, when considering the potential 
utilisation of the opt-in regime rather than the opt-out regime, this discretion 
should operate to protect those individuals who may be excluded from the 
class proceedings by virtue of the nature of opt-in proceedings. 
Linkside reinforces the submission that there is scope in South African law 
for the opt-in class action regime, coupled with the discretion of our courts 
to make opt-in, opt-out or no-notice orders. The finding in Mukaddam SCA 
that joinder is appropriate where the class members are identifiable 
effectively obviates the need for the opt-in class action regime. It appears 
that Nugent JA subscribed to the view that the opt-in procedure is nothing 
more than a permissive joinder device. This cannot be correct. As 
mentioned, there are circumstances where the class members are 
identifiable but where joinder is nonetheless cumbersome and unfeasible. 
A preferable approach is accordingly one in terms of which our courts are 
                                            
55  Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions 485. 
56  According to the Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions 469, 
where the opt-in procedure is followed, individual notice should be sent to identifiable 
class members. 
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afforded a discretion to choose, with regard to the circumstances of each 
case, whether to require opt-in, opt-out or no-notice at all. 
4  Conclusion  
The choice between opt-in and opt-out procedures is important insofar as 
the exercise of the choice may have the effect of excluding a large number 
of people from the class proceedings. Specifically in the context of the opt-
in procedure where claimants are required to actively rather than passively 
join the class proceedings, it is likely that the class would be smaller than 
where the opt-out procedure is utilised, potentially infringing upon the right 
to access to justice of the excluded class members. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that there is no choice to be made 
between opt-in and opt-out class actions. It may be that the circumstances 
of the case are such that the opt-in procedure is indeed preferable to the 
opt-out procedure. As was the case in Linkside, this may occur where the 
court is confronted with a relatively small group57 of individual claimants 
each of whom is identifiable and especially where each claimant has a 
substantial individual claim. In this regard, the court should assess whether 
the size of the claimants' individual claims is such that it is unlikely that they 
would, in the absence of class proceedings, litigate independently. If it is 
likely that they would litigate independently, then those claimants should be 
given an opportunity to opt into the proceedings. 
If in such a case the opt-out procedure rather than the opt-in procedure is 
utilised, it may be prejudicial to individuals who have no knowledge of the 
class proceedings but who are bound by its outcome, for if the opt-in 
procedure is followed and an individual is not given notice, then the class 
action judgment would not be binding upon that individual and he or she 
would be at liberty to pursue individualised litigation. The primary advantage 
of providing the court with judicial discretion to choose between requiring 
opt-in, opt-out and no-notice orders is that it enables the court to decide, 
with reference to the circumstances of the particular case, which procedure 
would be most suited to the overall disposition of the case.58 
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